Blockchains seem like the perfect technology for online voting. They can act as “bulletin boards,” global ledgers that were hypothesized (but never truly realized) in decades of e-voting research. Better still, blockchains enable smart contracts, which can execute on-chain elections autonomously and do away with election authorities.
Unfortunately, smart contracts aren’t just good for running elections. They’re also good for buying them.
In this blog post, we’ll explain how and why. As an example, we’ll present a fully implemented, simple vote buying attack against the popular on-chain CarbonVote system. We’ll also discuss how trusted hardware enables even more powerful vote buying techniques that seem irresolvable even given state-of-the art cryptographic voting protocols.
Finally, we introduce a new form of attack called a Dark DAO, not to be confused with the “Dark DAO” the same way DAOs should not be confused with The DAO. A Dark DAO is a decentralized cartel that buys on-chain votes opaquely (“in the dark”). We present one concrete embodiment based on Intel SGX.
In such an attack, potentially nobody, not even the DAO’s creator, can determine the DAO’s number of participants, the total amount of money pledged to the attack, or the precise logic of the attack: for example, the Dark DAO can attack a currency like Tezos, covertly collecting coins until it reaches some hidden threshold, and then telling its members to short the currency. Such a Dark DAO also has the unique ability to enforce an information asymmetry by sending out, for example, deniable short notifications: members inside the cartel would be able to verify the short signal, but themselves could generate seemingly authentic false signals to send to outsiders.
The existence of trust-minimizing vote buying and Dark DAO primitives imply that users of all on-chain votes are vulnerable to shackling, manipulation, and control by plutocrats and coercive forces. This directly implies that all on-chain voting schemes where users can generate their own keys outside of a trusted environment inherently degrade to plutocracy, a paradigm considered widely inferior to democratic models that such protocols attempt to approximate on-chain.
All of our schemes and attacks work regardless of identity controls, allowing user actions to be freely bought and sold. This means that schemes that rely on user-generated keys bound to user identities, like uPort or Circles, are also inherently and fundamentally vulnerable to arbitrary manipulation by plutocrats. Our schemes can also be repurposed to attack proof of stake or proof of work blockchains profitably, posing severe security implications for all blockchains.
Blockchain voting schemes abound today. There’s Votem, an end-to-end verifiable voting scheme that allows voting using mobile devices and leverages the blockchain as a place to securely post and tally the election results. Remix, the popular smart contract IDE, offers an election-administering smart contract as its training example. Yet more examples can be found here (1), here (2), and here (3).
On-chain voting schemes face many challenges, privacy, latency, and scaling among them. None of these is peculiar to voting, and all will eventually be surmountable. Vote buying is a different story.
In political systems, vote buying is a pervasive and corrosive form of election fraud, with a substantial history of undermining election integrity around the world. Sometimes, the price of a vote is a glass of beer. Thankfully, as scholars have observed, normal market mechanisms usually break down in vote buying schemes, for three reasons. First, vote buying is in most instances a crime. In the U.S., it’s punishable under federal law. Second, where secret ballots are used, compliance is hard to enforce. A voter can simply drink your beer, and cast her ballot in secret however she likes. Third, even if a voter does sell their vote, there is no guarantee the counter-party will pay.
No such obstacles arise in blockchain systems. Vote buying marketplaces can be run efficiently and effectively using the same powerful tool for administering elections: smart contracts. Pseudonymity and jurisdictional complications, as always, provide (some) cover against prosecution.
In general, electronic voting schemes are in some ways harder to secure against fraud than in-person voting, and have been the subject of general and academic interest for many years. One of the fundamental building blocks was introduced early by David Chaum, providing anonymous mix networks for messages which could be anonymously sent by participants with receipts of inclusion. Such end-to-end verifiable voting systems, where users can check that their votes are correctly counted without sacrificing privacy, are not just the realm of theoreticians and have actually been used for binding elections.
Later work by Benaloh and Tuinstra took issue with electronic voting schemes, noting that they offered voters a “receipt” that provided cryptographic proof of which way a given vote had been cast. This would allow for extremely efficient vote buying and coercion, clearly undesirable properties. The authors defined a new property, receipt-freedom, to describe voting schemes where no such cryptographic proof was possible. Further work by Juels, Catalano, and Jakobsson modeled even more powerful coercive adversaries, showing that even receipt-free schemes were not sufficient to prevent coercion and vote buying. This work defined a new security definition for voting schemes called “coercion resistance”, providing a protocol where no malicious party could successfully coerce a user in a manner that could alter election results.
In their work, Juels et. al note that “the security of our construction then relies on generation of the key pairs… by a trusted third party, or, alternatively, on an interactive, computationally secure key-generation protocol such as  between the players”. Such “trusted key generation”, “trusted third party”, or “trusted setup” assumptions are standard in the academic literature on coercion resistant voting schemes. Unfortunately, these requirements do not translate to the permissionless model, in which nodes can come and leave at any time without knowing each other a priori. This (somewhat) inherently means users generate their own keys in all such deployed systems, and cannot take advantage of trusted multiparty key generation or any centralized key service arbiter.
The blockchain space today, with predictable results, continues its tradition of ignoring decades of study and instead opts to implement the most naive possible form of voting: directly counting coin-weighted votes in a plutocratic fashion, stored in plain text on-chain. Unfortunately, it is not clear that better than such a plutocracy is achievable on-chain. We show that the permissionless model is fundamentally hostile to voting. Despite any identity or second-layer based mitigation attempts, all permissionless voting systems (or schemes that allow users to generate their own key in an untrusted environment) are vulnerable to the same style of vote buying and coercion attacks. Many vote buying attacks can also be used for coercion, shackling users to particular voting choices by force.
It is worth noting that the severity of bribery attacks in such protocols was partially explored by Vitalik Buterin, though concrete mechanisms were not provided. Here we describe frictionless mechanisms useful for vote, identity buying, coercion, and coordination at a high level and discuss the implications of these particular mechanisms.
Consider a very simple voting scheme: Holders of a token get one vote per token they hold and can change their votes continually until some closing block number. We’ll use this simple “EZVote” scheme to build intuition for how our attacks can work in any on-chain voting mechanism.
There are several possible escalating attack flavors of such a scheme.
The simplest low-coordination attack on on-chain voting systems involves vote buying smart contracts. Such smart contracts would simply pay users upon a provable vote for one option (or to participate in the vote, or to abstain from the vote if the vote is not anonymous). In EZVote, the smart contract could be a simple contract that holds your ERC20 until after the end date, votes yes, and returns it to you; all guarantees in the contract could be enforced by the underlying blockchain.
Such a scheme has advantages in that it requires only the trust assumptions already inherent in the underlying system, but has substantial disadvantages as well. For one, it is likely possible to publicly tell how many votes are purchased after the election is over, as this is required to handle the flow of payments in today’s smart contract systems. Also, the in-platform nature of the bribe opens it to censorship by parties interested in preserving the health of the underlying platform/system.
Depending on the nature of the voting scheme and the underlying protocol, there may be some workarounds for these downsides. Voters could for example provide a ring signature proving to a vote buyer that they are in a list of voters who votes yes in exchange for payments. We leave the implementation details and generalizability of such schemes open.
In general, any mechanism for private smart contracts can also be used for private vote buying, solving the public nature of a smart contract based attack; cryptographically an equivalent would be the vote buyer and seller generating a secret key for funds storage via MPC together, signing two transactions: a yes vote and a transaction that released funds to the vote seller after the end of the interval. The vote seller would move funds to this key only after possessing the transaction guaranteeing a refund and payment.
This would look similar to previous work on distributed certificate generation, adding security analysis for ensuring fairness. A naive implementation of such a scheme would encumber a users’ use of funds for other purposes during the vote (such actions are possible but require cooperation on behalf of the vote buyer; alternatively, a trusted/bonded escrow party can be used).
An even more concerning vote buying attack scheme involves the use of trusted hardware, such as Intel SGX. Such hardware has a key feature called remote attestation. Essentially, if Alice and Bob are communicating on the Internet, the trusted computing achieved by SGX allows Alice to prove to Bob that she is running a certain piece of code.
Trusted hardware is usually seen as a way to prove that you are running code that will not be malicious: for example, it is used in DRM to prove that a user will not copy files that are only temporarily licensed to them, like movies. Instead, we will use trusted hardware to shackle cryptocurrency users, paying or forcing them to use cryptocurrency wallets based on trusted hardware that provably restrict their space of allowed behaviors (e.g. by forcing them not to vote a certain way in an election) or allow the vote buyer trust-minimized but limited use of a user’s key (e.g. a vote buyer can force a user to sign “I Vote A”, but cannot steal or spend a user’s money).
The simplest way to deploy such technology for vote buying is to simply allow users to prove they are running a vote buyer’s malicious wallet code in exchange for a payment, secured on both sides by remote attestation technology.
In our “EZVote” example, a user would simply use a cryptocurrency wallet loaded on Intel’s SGX, running the vote buyer’s program. SGX would guarantee to the user that the wallet could never steal the user’s money (unless Intel colludes with the vote buyer). The user can provably use the wallet for everything they can do with a normal Ethereum wallet, including moving their money out (though in this case they would not be paid). The user runs their own wallet, and does not need to trust a third party for control or security of their funds. The user may not need to trust even Intel or the trusted hardware provisioner for security of their funds, as they can compile their own wallet!
When a predefined trigger condition occurs, such an SGX program would automatically vote on EZVote as the vote buyer commands, and send a receipt to the vote buyers. The vote buyer would itself be run an SGX enclave that maintains a total of all users who claim to have voted yes, and a list of their addresses. Given trust in SGX, the vote buyer need not see the full list of member users or know the total pledged amount. At the end of the vote, the vote buyer’s enclave would pay all the users who have not moved their funds or changed their vote. This would be accomplished by the enclave periodically posting a Merkle root summarizing users to be paid on-chain, providing proof to each user that they will eventually be paid. Users can claim payment after the expiry of some period by providing a proofs of inclusion in the posted Merkle history. In some particularly vulnerable vote designs, an SGX enclave can increase its efficiency by simply accumulating “yes” votes from users up-front as transactions, publishing and providing payment for them at the conclusion of the vote.
To prove the efficacy of these vote buying strategies, we first look at governance-critical coinvotes performed in existing cryptocurrency systems. Perhaps the most important such vote was the DAO CarbonVote. The operation of this vote was simple: accounts sent money to an address to vote yes, and another to vote no. Each address was a contract that logged the vote of a given address. The CarbonVote frontend then tallied the votes, and showed the net balances of all accounts that had voted yes and/or no. Later votes superseded earlier ones, allowing users to change their minds. At the end of the vote, a snapshot was taken of support and used to gauge community sentiment. This voting style is being reused for other controversial ecosystem issues, including EIP-186.
One possible trust-minimizing vote buying smart contract in this framework involves the use of escrow; users send Ether to an ERC20 token contract that holds the Ether until the end of the vote. For each Ether they deposit, users receive 1 VOTECOIN.
The contract is pre-programmed to vote yes at the end of the vote with 100% of the user Ether held. After the vote ends, each VOTECOIN token becomes fully refundable for the original Ether that created it. Users get back their original Ether, plus any bribes that vote buyers wish to pay them for this service.
We have implemented a full, open-source proof of concept of such a contract, enabling any vote buyers to contribute funds to the contract’s BRIBEPOOL. Users can be paid out from BRIBEPOOL by temporarily locking their Ether in the contract, and can reclaim 100% of their Ether at the end of the target vote. An attack can pay vote sellers out of BRIBEPOOL upfront (once they lock the coins, the votes are guaranteed), as dividends over time, or both.
Users can also sell their VOTECOIN after locking up their Ether, essentially making VOTECOIN a tokenized vote buying derivative. Vote sellers can then instantly unload their exposure to any risks introduced by funds lockup to parties that are indifferent to the vote’s outcome: because each ERC20 is programatically guaranteed to eventually receive all original ETH, this essentially creates a one-way-only funnel from the base asset into a derivative asset dedicated to voting a predefined way. Buyers who are uninterested in the vote's outcome should always lock their ETH if guaranteed a non-negative payoff, and essentially have an option to later unload onto other similarly uninterested buyers. If dividends from BRIBEPOOL are paid over time to VOTECOIN in addition to upfront, these derivative tokens can even be used to speculate on the success of the attack itself.
This smart contract can be simplified with the use of oracles such as Town Crier (multiple oracles, prediction markets, etc. can be combined as well). Because the CarbonVote system publishes results including full voter logs on Etherscan, it is relatively trivial to check which way someone has voted using any external web scraping oracles, paying them if their vote included in the final snapshot agreed with the buyers’ preference.
A Dark DAO-like model can also trivially be used. Each user simply runs a wallet that, some time after each transfer transaction, also votes the desired way on the CarbonVote (in fact this may become standard behavior for many wallets). The user is only paid if such votes are registered, so the user is incentivized to make sure this vote transaction is included on-chain. There is no way for the network to tell how many votes in a given CarbonVote are generated by such a vote buying cartel, and how many are legitimate.
Inherent in any of these schemes is the ability to minimize trust when pooling assets across multiple vote buyers; bribery smart contracts could simply allow anyone to pay into the BRIBEPOOL, and SGX networks can be architected similarly for open participation.
Some schemes, such as the EIP999 vote, have even more severe problems. In these schemes, if a user votes twice, the later of such votes is chosen. A simple and severe attack is then to simply collect signatures on both “yes” and “no” votes from a user, spamming the chosen signature towards the end of the election period and relying on an ability to overwhelm the blockchain to ensure that most such votes persist. Alternatively, because contract deployers are able to vote for all the funds in a given contract, another attack is to simply force a user to use a contract-based wallet for the duration of the vote that is deployed by the vote buyer, who can then control the votes of all funds locked in contracts arbitrarily without custody of these funds.
Bitcoin is not immune to this problem either. Bitcoin’s community often leans on coin-votes, and similar vote buying schemes can be applied (as either Ethereum smart contracts as in this work, or in Dark DAO-style; Bitcoin itself does not provide native support for sufficiently rich contracts to buy votes).
Astute readers may point out that all permissionless blockchains inherently rely on some form of permissionless voting, namely the consensus algorithm itself. Every time a blockchain comes to global consensus on some attributes of state, what is taking place is essentially a permissionless (often coin or PoW-weighted) vote in a permissionless setting.
It is perhaps no surprise that “vote buying” has seen some exploration in these contexts. For example, smart contracts on Ethereum can be used to attack Ethereum and other blockchains through censorship, history revision, or incentivizing empty blocks. Such attacks work directly on the proof-of-work vote itself, bribing miners according to their weighted work. There is little reason to believe that proof of stake systems would be immune to similar attacks, especially in the presence of complex delegated voting structures whose incentives may be unclear and whose formal analysis may be incomplete or nonexistent.
A disturbing concept related to our exploration of Dark DAOs for vote buying is what we term the “Fishy DAO”, named after the classic flash game. In this (super fun!) game, you start out as a small fish. The rules are simple; you can eat smaller competitor fish, but not fish the same size as or larger than you. You get a little bit bigger after each meal, until you eventually (if you are lucky) grow to dominate the ocean. A modern equivalent that doesn’t require Flash and adds networking is agar.io.
A Fishy DAO would use Dark DAO-like technology as described above to do the same for blockchains. Using SGX, Fishy DAO members can receive non-transferable (DAO members can verify message authenticity, but non-members cannot tell if a message is forged) notifications when an attack threshold is reached, allowing them to short currency markets shortly before such an attack. Each blockchain Fishy DAO attack brings some profit to Fishy DAO, and the ensuing publicity of even failed attacks gives Fishy DAO notoriety with the profit-seeking but perhaps unethical (in some frameworks). If Fishy DAO fails to achieve required thresholds, Fishy DAO simply fades away and refunds its participants, potentially but not necessarily burning some amount of their money to incentivize them to recruit participation.
Fishy DAO requires Dark DAO technology, as if performed in the open with a smart contract, observable participation rates would provide market signals to the underlying blockchain’s price, rendering the attack unprofitable by allowing risk to be priced in. It is the cryptographically enforceable information asymmetry between DAO members and wider ecosystem participants that makes such an attack feasible.
Note that Dark DAOs have implications far beyond the above. Consider for example a Dark DAO that aimed to profitably buy users’ basic income identities, paying up front at a small fee to receive a user’s regular basic income payments. Or a Dark DAO for getting through credit checks secured on key-based identities by leasing (with trust minimized limitations) such keys from users with good credit. Or a Dark DAO that runs an evil mining pool, provably attacking an ASIC-based proof of work cryptocurrency with an unstoppable attack pool of potentially undetectable size.
One can also imagine that with identity, there may be social safeguards against buying behavior in the identity system itself. For example, some identity systems may allow a user to show up in person to revoke or manage identities, which could socially circumvent automated technical safeguards against identity theft. There are still ways around this: the classic solution in loans is through collateral. Potentially a "bondsman" like business could also provide social guarantees of repayment through physical/legal intimidation and contract for users who cannot afford collateral. Payday loan and bail bond establishments would be ideally suited for that kind of business if such a permissionless basic income system were ever deployed alongside current market systems, at least in the US (in many other places there are likely even less savory institutions that could be willing to step in for an appropriate cut).
The coordination space of mechanisms in blockchains is large, and the environment hostile. All voting or financially incentivized identity-based schemes should be very careful to consider the implications of the underlying permissionless model on long-term viability, scalability, and security.
Maybe you are an academic skimming this article, or maybe an interested user wondering exactly what this all means. There are a few interesting and very surprising (in the research literature) insights to be gleaned from our thought experiments above:
Obviously, these all require further exploration, tweaking, and proof. But I think we have at least provided some intuition for why we believe the above to hold in a principled analysis framework.
The trend of on-chain voting in blockchain is inspired by the long human tradition of voting and democracy. Unfortunately, safeguards available to us in the real world, such as enforced private/deniable voting, approximate identity controls, and attributability of widespread fraud are simply not available in the permissionless model. When public keys generated by the users themselves are used, on-chain voting is not able to provide guarantees about these users having any anti-coercion guarantees. Elaborate voting schemes do little to quell (and in many cases indeed aggravate) the problem. On-chain voting schemes further complicate incentives, creating an unstable and tangled mess of incentives that can at any time be altered by trustless smart contract or Dark DAO-style vote buying, bribery, and griefing schemes.
We encourage the community to be highly skeptical of the outcome of any on-chain vote, specifically as on-chain voting becomes an ever-important staple of decision making in blockchain systems. The space for designing mechanisms that enable new forms of abuse with lower-than-ever coordination costs supports the position that votes should be used for signals not decisions, and that a wide variety of voting mechanisms should fill such roles. Without such safeguards, it remains possible that all on-chain voting systems degenerate into plutocracy through direct vote and participation buying and even vote tokenization.
Such attacks have substantial implications for the future security of all blockchain-based voting systems.
We’d like to thank Patrick McCorry for his helpful, thorough feedback throughout the lifecycle of this post, and pioneering work in vote buying and on-chain voting systems.
We notice several distinguishing factors in on-chain voting systems: